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PROTECTIONISM, PUNISHMENT AND
PARIAHS: SEX OFFENDERS AND
RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS
Meghan Silē Towers*
INTRODUCTION
At the highest levels of government, the U.S. Congress
recently approved the Adam Walsh1 Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006,2 which unifies the sex offender registration system
nationally and provides funding for states and local governments
to create and research electronic monitoring programs targeting
sex offenders.3 Meanwhile, at a more local level, states, towns
and municipalities have begun to pass strict laws regarding the
disclosure of registered sex offenders and their residences. Sex
*
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thanks to the entire staff of the JLP for their brazen bluebooking.
1
Adam Walsh was 6 years old when he was abducted and murdered. He
was the son of John and Revé Walsh, who later created “America’s Most
Wanted” and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children in
response to their son’s tragic death. Reid Praises Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act, U.S. NEWSWIRE July 20, 2006.
2
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, H.R. 4472,
th
109 Cong. (2006) (enacted).
3
Id.
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offenders, 96% of whom are men,4 who have been tried,
convicted and punished in accordance with the criminal justice
system, are restricted by these local and federal laws. But after
their time is served and their debt to society is paid, there will
be increasingly no redemption, no clean slate, but rather a
growing list of rules and prohibitions that greatly restricts the
lives these individuals can lead following their jail time. While
most people consider it a small price to pay for the safety of
America’s children, a handful of individuals and groups5 have
begun to question these laws as representing a system of ex post
facto punishment that makes pariahs out of sex offenders.
Congressional acts named after brutally murdered little girls,
like Megan’s Law,6 provide for a strict system of registering and
monitoring convicted sex offenders. The effectiveness and
fairness of these laws have been examined by the judiciary and
the public—with almost universal acceptance and support.7
However, the public has recently thought these restrictions
insufficient. As high profile cases of abduction, sexual torture
and murder flood America’s television screens, local politicians
are trying new ways to keep children safe from sexual
predators.8 Towns in Iowa,9 Oklahoma, and twelve other states10
4

Lawrence Greenfeld, An Analysis of Data on Rape and Sexual Assault:
Sex Offenses and Offenders, 21 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS (1997).
5
The American Civil Liberties Union is one group that has consistently
challenged residency restrictions on behalf of many “John Does.”
6
Megan’s Law, HR 2137, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted).
7
See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (holding
that current dangerousness of a convicted sex offender irrelevant to whether
they should be included in the state’s registry) and Gunderson v. Hvaas, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21783 (2002) (upholding that a sex offender who pled to a
lesser sentence still had to register with state because circumstance of offense
similar to those of higher offenses and since statute was regulatory right of
presumed innocence did not apply).
8
Manuel Roig-Franzia, Miami Beach Mayor Seeks to Exclude Sex
Offenders, WASHINGTON POST, April 25, 2005, at A03 (discussing the death
of Jessica Lunsford and Sarah Lunde and the effect these deaths had on the
media, public and subsequently politics).
9
Julie Hilden, Are the Pedophile-Free Zones Constitutional? The Issues
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are initiating legislation that limits access of certain areas to
registered sex offenders. Specifically, registered sex offenders
are prevented from living or working near schools, playgrounds
and other locations frequented by children.11 This intersection of
property rights and civil sanctions, public fear and private shame
brings an important discussion to the public forum: when does
prevention cross the line into punishment and how does local
government reconcile the freedom of movement and rights of
property with residence restrictions that look similar to
restrictive zoning?
This note looks at these new zoning regulations through the
lens of property and practicality. First this note will examine the
framework provided by The City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey,12 regarding a state isolating itself from common
problems, and apply the same analysis to a comparable problem
of statewide sex offender residency restrictions like those in
Iowa. Next this note will take the framework regarding
exclusionary zoning laws as set forth in the landmark property
case Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel13 and apply it to modern residence restrictions regarding
registered sex offenders. By employing these principals to
residency restrictions this note will seek to create a method for
understanding how individual property rights and common
responsibility interact with local fears and public concerns. It
will also reveal how the current form of residency restrictions
have an unfair effect of pushing the burden of treating and

they May Raise, FINDLAW, Aug. 30, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
hilden/20050830.html (examining residence restrictions in Iowa and revealing
possible constitutional challenges).
10
In Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 714 (2005) the court identifies twelve
other states that have residency restrictions for sex offenders, including:
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Tennessee.
11
See DEVON B. ADAMS, SUMMARY OF STATE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY
DISSEMINATION PROCEDURES, (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1999).
12
The City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
13
Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151 (1975) [hereinafter Mt. Laurel].
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monitoring convicted sex offenders onto towns and
municipalities with smaller populations, smaller budgets and
fewer resources. In the end, this system will only compound the
problem of dealing with sex offenders. Finally, this note will
examine the criticism of residence restrictions and address
possible alternative solutions, such as housing arrangements,
additional monitoring, education and individualized attention.
I. SEX OFFENDER LAWS
There are various laws14 throughout the United States
designed to help law enforcement officials and communities fight
sex offenders and other child predators.15 This note specifically
focuses on residency restrictions imposed on convicted sex
offenders following their parole from prison, though registries
will also be discussed. Residency restrictions are relatively new
restraints and part of a larger system that restricts and controls
paroled sex offenders. These restrictions placed on sex offenders
14

One such measure is the AMBER Alert System. AMBER stands for
America’s Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response, and it is named after
Amber Hagerman, a 9-year old who was kidnapped and brutally murdered
while riding her bicycle in Arlington, Texas. Following her death, in 1996
local police and Dallas-Fort Worth broadcasters developed an early warning
system. The system requires that after there has been a kidnapping that meets
certain specific criteria all local radio and TV broadcasters as well as state
transportation officials are notified. These various groups issue alerts
interrupting regular broadcasting and reaching anyone listening to a radio,
watching TV or traveling on roadways. This system spread throughout the
nation. Now all 50 states have AMBER Alert Systems and the Department of
Justice is currently working to create a seamless national system. U.S.
Department of Justice, AMBER Alert: History and Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.amberalert.gov/about/faqs.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
2006).
15
For the context of this note the term “sex offenders” refers to adults
who have committed sexual crimes against children. At times there will be
distinctions drawn between child molesters, or sex offenders whose sexual
crime with children did not include intercourse, and statutory rapists, whose
sexual crime with children included intercourse. PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA
L. SCHMITT AND MATTHEW R. DUROSE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS
RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 4 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003).
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are often coupled with other requirements, most notably
registry requirements.16
A. Registries
Registry requirements are the most common form of control
exercised over paroled sex offenders. All fifty states have sex
offender registration acts (“SORAs”) that require sex offenders
to register with the state, and often require notification of the
offender’s status to neighbors and local law enforcement.17 Sex
offender registries are kept by local police and contain the
names, addresses and criminal histories of sex offenders residing
within a given area.18 Disclosure laws require that schools and
other interested parties be informed of sex offenders living
nearby.19 Many have the information available online, along
with pictures and maps of neighborhoods pinpointing the
residences of sex offenders.20 In addition, many sites also
include a disclaimer requiring that a user acknowledges that the
information on the site might include mistakes and that its use is
for legitimate purposes.21
16

The same states that have residence restrictions also have registry
requirements. Compare, Adams, supra note 11 and Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d
700 (2005).
17
Jane A. Small, Who are the people in your neighborhood? Due
Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1451, 1451 (Nov. 1999) (examining current SORAs and
their related problems).
18
See Adams, supra note 11.
19
Id.
20
For example, the Kentucky State Registration website includes pictures
of offenders. http://www.kentuckystatepolice.org/sor.htm#search. The
California State Registration website includes a searchable map according to
city, county, zip code or school that will pinpoint where a sex offender lives
within a certain radius. http://meganslaw.ca.gov (click “Continue”; then
check the “I have read the disclaimer and agree to these terms and
conditions” box; then click “Continue”).
21
Websites that list Sex Offenders often contain cautions that the
information found on the site cannot be used for criminal persecutions, such
as harassment, and that such a use of the information is subject to
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The push for this form of surveillance came on the heels of
the high profile murder of Megan Kanka.22 Megan lived in a
reportedly quiet neighborhood in Hamilton Township, New
Jersey.23 On July 29, 1994 she was lured into the house of a
neighbor with the promise of a puppy.24 The neighbor was Jesse
Timmendequas, a man previously convicted twice of sexual
crimes against children.25 Timmendequas lived with two other
convicted sex offenders across the street from Megan’s home.26
After luring Megan into the house, Timmendequas raped her
and then killed her by strangling her with a belt to ensure her
silence.27 Timmendequas eventually confessed to the murder and
led a search party to the field where Megan’s body was found.28
Timmendequas was sentenced to death and is as of the date of
this publication awaiting execution.29
The story of Megan Kanka was highly publicized and the
New Jersey legislature, galvanized by public outcry, passed
legislation that required sex offenders to register with local
police upon parole.30 The registry laws also require disclosure of
the name and address of the sex offender to neighbors, local
schools and other places frequented by children.31 If a sex
offender moves, then he or she must notify the police.32
prosecution.
22
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Background on the Act and Its
Amendments, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/what/2a2jwactbackground.html
(last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
23
Seamus McGraw, Suffer the Children: The Story of Megan’s Law,
Court TV, http://www.crimelibrary.com/serial_killers/predators/kanka/1.html
(last visited Dec. 11, 2006).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
McGraw, supra note 23.
29
Id.
30
Division of Criminal Justice, New Jersey Office of the Attorney
General, Megan’s Law, http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/megan/ (last visited
Sept. 25, 2005).
31
Id.
32
There have been many problems with the sex offender registries.
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Following New Jersey’s lead, other states ratified sex
offender registry laws.33 On a national level, in 1996 President
Clinton signed an updated version of the Jacob Wetterling
Crimes Against Children Act.34 This act had a provision
popularly referred to as Megan’s Law,35 which required every
state to develop some sort of procedure for notifying the public
when a sex offender is released into their community.36 The
procedures differ from state to state,37 but common elements
include the release of personal information such as names,
addresses, criminal history and even photographs to neighbors,
schools and any party that expresses interest in the
information.38 For example,39 in Alabama if an offender qualifies
for notification, a flyer with his or her photograph is mailed to
all residents living within a specified distance.40 In Rhode
Island, all schools, day care facilities and other related
Cases of mistaken identity have caused innocent people to be treated like
criminals. Also, in some states the definition of a “sex offender” is not
limited to people that have committed violent sexual crimes with children but
includes other groups that pose no danger to society. Men convicted of
consensual sodomy with women or other men are considered sex offenders.
As are women convicted of prostitution and any one convicted of statutory
rape. These offenders are lumped in with violent offenders—those guilty of
child molestation, rape and other sexual violence. See generally, National
Institute of Corrections, Fifty State Survey on Sex Offender Registry (2006),
http://www.nicic.org/Library/021768.
33
For example, New York signed their own version of Megan’s Law in
July
1995.
New
York
State
Sex
Offender
Registry,
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/nsor/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
34
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act, Title 17, 108 Stat. 2038, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 14071.
35
Pub.L. 104-145, May 17, 1996, 110 Stat. 1345.
36
Id.
37
For a comprehensive list of state sex offender registries see ADAMS,
supra note 11. This report also lists how each state registry can be accessed
and what information is available to the general public. Id.
38
Small, supra note 17, at 1461.
39
For a complete listing of the notification procedures of each state see
ADAMS, supra note 11.
40
Id. at 3.
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institutions are notified.41 Parents of children attending such
places are also notified.42 Although these registries remain
immensely popular, as this note argues, there are also some
problems associated with them.
Sex Offender Registry Acts or SORAs are often criticized as
overbroad—snaring anyone convicted of a sexual crime.43 They
also raise concerns over such potential problems as improper
notification, vigilantism, false sense of security and ex post facto
or double jeopardy issues.44 SORAs have been challenged,
usually under the Due Process guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment.45 Some state courts have found that SORAs
implicate a Due Process interest, but very few have found a
liberty or property interest involved.46
B. Constitutionality of Registration Laws
Federally, the constitutionality of SORAs have been
addressed recently by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe.47
Smith challenged the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act,
which required sex offenders incarcerated in Alaska to register
with the Department of Corrections within thirty days of their
release.48 Depending on the level of offense, a convicted sex
offender would have to ratify the information annually or
41

Id. at 7.
Id.
43
See supra note 32 for a further discussion.
44
Small, supra note 17, at 1465-470.
45
See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (discussing
that current dangerousness of a convicted sex offender is irrelevant to
whether they should be included in the state’s registry) and Gunderson v.
Hvaas, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21783 (2002) (holding that a sex offender
who pled to a lesser sentence still had to register with state because
circumstance of offense similar to those of higher offenses and since the
statute was regulatory right of presumed innocence did not apply).
46
Given that current laws affect where sex offenders can live and also
their property rights—a Fourteenth Amendment challenge may be stronger
now that zoning laws have come into play.
47
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
48
Id. at 90-91.
42
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quarterly for a specified number of years.49 The state would also
publish certain information about the registrant, such as address,
date and place of conviction and sentence etc., on the internet.50
In its analysis of the constitutionality of this Act, the Court
first examined whether “the legislature meant the statute to
establish civil proceedings.”51 If the Court found legislative
intent to impose punishment then the law would be deemed
invalid under the Ex Post Facto Clause.52 However, if the Court
found legislative intent to “enact a regulatory scheme that is
civil and non-punitive”53 then the Court would look to determine
whether the scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect “as
to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.”54 If the law
passed these tests then it is deemed constitutional.55
In Smith the Supreme Court concluded that Alaska’s Sex
Offender Registration Act was non-punitive; therefore, asking
sex offenders to register did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution.56 The Court found the Act was
within the interests of the state to protect the health and safety of
its citizens.57 Based on the language of the statute and the
legislative record, the Court found that facially the statute was
designed to protect the public.58 The Court noted that when a
state uses its power to protect the health and safety of its
citizens, there is a presumption that the legislative intent was to

49

Id. at 90.
Id. at 91.
51
Id. at 92.
52
Id. The Ex Post Facto Clause is found in the United States
Constitution Article I, § 9, Clause 3, and forbids the enactment of ex post
facto laws, which are laws that apply retroactively and may criminalize an
action that was legal when it was committed. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
264-65 (8th Ed. 2004).
53
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 105-106.
57
Id.
58
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003).
50
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exercise the state’s regulatory power.59 This logic, therefore,
defeated the argument that the state intended to impose
punishment with the registration requirement.60
Next, the Court examined Alaska’s implementation of the
Registration Act. Again the Court ruled that the scheme was
non-punitive since the Act had “contemplated distinctly civil
procedures”61 for its administration.62 The Court then examined
the effects the Act had on the paroled sex offenders. The Court
analyzed the registry requirements by examining:
whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory
scheme: has been regarded in our history and
traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative
disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of
punishment; has a rational connection to a
nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to
this purpose.63
The court then examined each of these issues to determine if the
Act was non-punitive.
If a state chooses to punish then it might adopt a traditional
form of punishment so that the public will recognize it as such.64
Comparing the registration requirements with colonial shaming,
the Court stated that the aim of such punishments was typically
to impose permanent stigmas on the offenders which effectively
ostracized the guilty.65 The court also noted that “the most
serious offenders were banished,66 after which they could neither
59

Id.
Id.
61
One example was allowing the managerial aspects of the regime to be
handled by the same body that dealt with civil matters. Id. at 96.
62
Id. at 96.
63
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 98.
66
In Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719-20 (2005), which will be
discussed in detail in Part III. B., one of the arguments used against
residency restrictions is that they are similar to the colonial punishment of
banishment, which the Court here acknowledges as historically one of the
worst punishments. Smith, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003).
60
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return to their original community, nor reputation tarnished, be
admitted easily into a new one.”67 In comparison, the Court
ruled that the stigma from registry restrictions resulted from the
“dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record,
most of which is already public.”68 The Court further noted that
widespread public access to registry information was necessary
to promote the goals of the scheme, namely those of public
protection.69 Therefore, the Court held that registry requirements
do not parallel what historically has been thought of as
punishment nor did they promote the traditional aims of
punishment.70
In Smith, the Court then examined whether the registration
requirements imposed an affirmative disability or restraint on the
offenders.71 There was no physical restraint imposed by the Act,
and the Court observed that offenders would not be completely
unemployable nor would they be unable to find places to live,
stating that the Act caused no “substantial occupational or
housing disadvantages for former sex offenders that would not
have otherwise occurred through the use of routine background
checks by employers and landlords.”72 After determining that
there was no affirmative disability or restraint imposed, the
Court quickly dealt with the Act’s rational connection to a nonputative purpose.73 The Court held that the risk of recidivism
posed by sex offenders74 combined with the non-excessive

67

Smith, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003).
Id.
69
Id. at 99.
70
See id. at 98-99.
71
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98-99 (2003).
72
Id. at 100.
73
Id. at 102-03.
74
According to the court’s reading of U.S. Department of Justice
reports, “when convicted sex offenders reenter society they are much more
likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or
sexual assault.” Id. at 102. However, as will be discussed in Section III.D, of
this note recidivist rates among criminals arrested for non-sexual crimes were
much higher. Therefore, while sex offenders may be the most likely to
commit another rape, they do not have the highest recidivist rate among
68
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duration of the reporting requirements resulted in the fact that
the Act was reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective.75 In
the end, the Court held the Act constitutional.76
While Smith v. Doe established that statewide Sex Offender
Registries were constitutional, some of the framework discussed
by the Court supports the idea that residence restrictions might
be impermissible or at least subject to scrutiny.77 Specifically,
the finding that registries result in no additional housing
disadvantages for sex offenders,78 do not “ostracize” them,79 and
are dissimilar from “banishment”80 is in sharp contrast with the
realities of the newest limits imposed on sex offenders: residence
restrictions.
C. Residence Restrictions
Residence restrictions are statutory laws that control where
sex offenders can live under the terms of their parole.81 The
most common form of these restrictions limits sex offenders
from residing within specified distances from schools, day care
centers, playgrounds, parks and other places where children
congregate.82
Residence restrictions have become popular in recent years.
Several states have enacted strict rules regarding where

convicts as is often reported.
75
Id. at 103-06.
76
Id. at 106.
77
This note will apply the framework from Smith v. Doe to residence
restrictions later in the note, after residence restrictions have been discussed
and explained. See Section C.3, supra.
78
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003).
79
Id. at 99.
80
Id. at 98.
81
Jill S. Levenson and Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender
Resident Restrictions: 1,000 Feet from Danger or One Step from Absurd?,
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF OFFENDER THERAPY AND COMPARATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 168, 175 (2005).
82
See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 715 n.14 (2005).
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convicted sex offenders may reside.83 The rules are diverse and
vary greatly from state to state. For example, in Arkansas a
registered sex offender cannot live within 2,000 feet of
elementary or secondary schools and daycare facilities.84 In
California, convicted sex offenders may not reside within any
single family dwelling with another sex offender unless they are
related by blood, marriage or adoption.85 In Illinois, the
residence restriction states that a child sex offender may not
“knowingly reside within 500 feet of a playground or facility
providing programs or services exclusively directed toward
persons under eighteen years of age.”86 The Illinois restriction
also includes a section that forbids approaching, contacting or
communicating with children by registered sex offenders in
parks or other areas frequented by children.87 Similar residence
restrictions have been adopted in some form by many states,
including large states such as New York and California.88
In addition to state residence restrictions, some municipalities
and other smaller geopolitical areas have also enacted strict laws
limiting where sex offenders can reside. For example, the mayor
of Miami Beach garnered considerable attention for pushing
legislation that creates a buffer zone around places where
children regularly congregate and the homes of sex offenders.89
This zone stretches for 2,500 feet around such areas and makes
it almost impossible for sex offenders to live within Miami
Beach.90 While Florida91 already has statewide residence
83

See Devon B. Adams, Summary of State Sex Offender Registry
Dissemination Procedures, (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1999).
84
A.C.A. § 5-14-128 (2005).
85
Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 3003.5 (2005).
86
720 ILCS 5/11-9.4 (2005).
87
Id.
88
Other states include: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and
Tennessee. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 715 (2005).
89
Manuel Roig-Franzia, Miami Beach Mayer Seeks to Exclude Sex
Offenders: Wider Buffer Covers Nearly Entire City, WASHINGTON POST, Apr.
25, 2005, at A3.
90
Id.
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restrictions for sex offenders, some municipalities are
discovering that the public fear of sex offenders warrants stricter
limitations.
1. Municipal Residency Restriction—Hamilton Township, NJ
Hamilton Township was the home of Megan Kanka and the
birthplace of the movement in the 1990s to register sex
offenders.92 Now Hamilton Township is at the forefront of
another trend—residency restrictions. On May 17, 2005 the
Township Council of Hamilton Township voted unanimously in
favor of Ordinance 05-017, which extended residence
restrictions for sex offenders to 2,500 feet from a school,
playground, childcare center or park.93 Hamilton Township still
enacted one of the most restrictive requirements in the United
States, even though New Jersey already had a residency
restriction in place.94 However, this more restrictive rule makes
Hamilton Township the fortified castle in the already restrictive
fort that is New Jersey.
2. State Residency Restriction—Iowa
In 2002 the Iowa State legislature passed a residency
restriction that applied to convicted sex offenders who had been
involved in certain offenses with a minor.95 The residence
restriction required that such offenders live outside of 2000 feet
of a school or a registered child care facility.96 At the time of its
91

See FLA. STAT. § 948.30 (2005).
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Background on the Act and Its
Amendments, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/what/2a2jwactbackground.html
(last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
93
Township of Hamilton, Meeting Minutes—Township Council
(May 17, 2005) available at, http://www.hamiltonnj.com/index.htm?/
announcements/council_agendas_minutes.htm [hereinafter Hamilton Township
Meeting Minutes].
94
See Adams, supra note 11.
95
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2005).
96
Id.
92
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passage, this state-wide restriction was one of the harshest and
resulted in a great deal of controversy.97
3. Smith v. Doe as applied to Residence Restrictions
Smith98 examined a challenge to Alaska’s Sex Offender
Registry law. Since Smith is the only recent Supreme Court case
dealing with the regulation of paroled sex offenders, it is a valid
framework for contemplating how the Supreme Court would
handle a similar challenge to residence restrictions. Some of the
arguments that the Court considered in Smith are also applicable
to analyzing a challenge to residence restrictions. While others
do not have the same effect when applied to residence
restrictions.
Since residence restrictions limit where sex offenders may
reside based on proximity to schools, parks, playgrounds and
other sites as previously discussed, such restrictions do exactly
what the Court implied was improper.99 For example, Iowa’s
residence limitations resulted in restricted areas that
encompassed the majority of available housing in cities and in
small towns because the presence of a single school or child care
center could cause the entire town to be off limits to sex
offenders.100 Calling this a housing disadvantage, as this note
argues, is an understatement. As such, residence restrictions,
unlike registries similar to the Alaskan registry as examined in
Doe v. Smith, do impose additional housing disadvantages for
sex offenders, and therefore, would defeat one argument of the
Supreme Court in favor of registries.
In addition, in Smith, the Court pointed out that since the
97
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registries were not similar to colonial punishment, then it was
unlikely that the registries were punitive.101 However, residence
restrictions effectively ostracize the guilty and also ban offenders
from living in certain areas. If there are very few areas in cities
and larger towns where sex offenders can live, then the result of
residence restrictions will be to herd registered offenders
together into these permissible areas. Eventually, extrapolating
on the effect of residence restrictions, entire neighborhoods
might become populated largely by registered sex offenders,
creating modern day penal enclaves in cities and towns across
America.102 Forcing sex offenders to live together might have
the additional adverse effect of preventing their reintegration
into society and instigating further instances of abuse.103 Thus, it
appears residence restrictions have the effect of ostracizing and
banning offenders. Once again they are more punitive in effect
than registries and defeat yet another prong of Smith that
allowed the Supreme Court to find such restrictions
constitutional.
Using the framework of the leading Supreme Court case that
addresses sex offender parole requirements similar to residence
restrictions reveals that residence restrictions raise concerns of
constitutionality that registries do not. A challenge of residence
restrictions as a punitive measure in violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the Constitution might be successful.104 In
addition, there are cases from a purely public policy prospective
that raise additional concerns of the validity of residence
restrictions.105

101

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003).
Cf. Lisa Henderson, Comment, Sex Offenders: You are Now Free To
Move About the Country, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 797, 804 (2005).
103
Id. at 802.
104
See infra Section III.B for the discussion concerning Doe v. Miller.
In Miller, the Eighth circuit dismissed these arguments. However, there are a
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See infra Section V.
102

MEGHAN

3/7/2007 1:25 PM

SEX OFFENDERS AND RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS 307
II. RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS AND PROTECTIONISM
Sex offender residence restrictions have protectionist
tendencies. This section seeks to compare residence restrictions
to past state efforts to isolate themselves from a problem that
crosses state lines. First, a prior decision of the Supreme Court
dealing with state protectionism will be examined. Then the
framework provided by the Supreme Court will be used to
address protectionism in regards to Iowa residence restrictions.
A. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey
In early 1974, New Jersey enacted a statutory provision that
prohibited the importation of most “solid or liquid waste which
originated or was collected outside of the territorial limits of the
State.”106 Cities in other states that had arrangements with
private landfill operators in New Jersey challenged this law.107
While the trial court declared the law unconstitutional because it
interfered with interstate commerce, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the statute was a legitimate exercise in the
protection of vital health and environmental concerns that posed
no great burden upon interstate commerce and was, therefore,
permissible.108 The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the relevance
of the purported environmental protection the law was supposed
to provide.109 Then the Court held that discriminating against
articles of commerce110 coming from outside the state was
impermissible under the Commerce Cause unless there was
another way to distinguish the articles besides their place of
origin.111 The Court ruled with the understanding that small
burdens on interstate commerce would be tolerated provided that
106

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 618 (1978).
Id. at 619.
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Id. at 620.
109
Id.
110
The Supreme Court adopted the view of the New Jersey Supreme
Court that the movement of waste constituted commerce for the purpose of an
analysis of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 621.
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City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1975).
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a state legislature had the goal and effect of protecting the health
and safety of that state’s citizens.112 In addition, the Court also
stated: “What is crucial is the attempt by one State to isolate
itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier
against the movement of interstate trade.”113 The Court went on
to scold New Jersey for attempting to “saddle those outside the
State with the entire burden”114 associated with reducing waste
in New Jersey.115
Sex offender residency restrictions facially appear to have
very little in common with New Jersey waste restrictions, but
important analogies can be drawn. In both situations states are
faced with an undesirable. No one wants sex offenders living
next door, just as no one wants to live next to a landfill. Yet
both of these unwanted problems exist in this country, in all
states and in all communities. The question then becomes
whether it is permissible for one state to isolate itself from a
problem common to many by erecting effective barriers—in this
case residence restrictions—that severely limit where sex
offenders may live within a state.
B. Doe v. Miller
In Doe v. Miller,116 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit examined the constitutionality of Iowa Code § 692A.2A,
which prohibited a person convicted of sex offenses against
minors from residing within 2,000 feet of a school or registered
child care facility.117 The district court held that this law was
constitutional because it fell within the state’s power to protect
the health and safety of the citizens of Iowa, and that on its face,
the residency restrictions were not unconstitutional.118 The U.S.
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Id. at 623-24.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 629.
Id.
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 705 (citing Iowa Code § 692.2A (2002)).
Id. at 704.
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.119
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit first addressed the reasoning
of the lower court in finding Iowa Code § 692A.2A
unconstitutional.120 The circuit court dismissed the lower court’s
conclusion that the residence restrictions encompassed such a
large majority of the land in cities and larger towns that the only
available housing left for sex offenders was in small enclaves in
the cities or in rural areas where available housing was “not
necessarily readily available.”121 The circuit court pointed out
that “while the residency restriction may have exacerbated a
housing problem for the plaintiffs, not all their difficulty was
caused by the statute.”122 The court found that housing problems
occurred for many of the plaintiffs not because of the residence
restriction, but because of their own money troubles or status as
convicted felons; factors that would remain even if the statute
were repealed.123
The Court then turned to the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process challenge to § 692A.2A.124 First, the court dismissed
the challenge based on procedural due process, pointing out that
the statute was not vague and that the legislature could draw
classifications amongst felons provided that the “substantive
rule” does not conflict with provisions of the constitution.125
Substantive due process was the next challenge to
§ 692A.2A.126 The plaintiffs claimed that the statute infringed on
their “right to privacy and choice in family matters, the right to
travel and ‘the fundamental right to live where you want.’”127
To support this the plaintiffs applied the reasoning from Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, which dealt with zoning restrictions
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that attempted to reach into the home and limit the type of
relatives that could live together in order to qualify as a “singlefamily home.”128 The Eighth Circuit dismissed this comparison,
pointing out that the law did not restrict who may live with sex
offenders, but merely restricted where the residence they cohabited could be located.129 Therefore, the court did not find
infringement on matters relating to marriage and the family that
would require strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment.130
The court also rejected the argument that the residence
restriction infringed on the right to travel.131 “The Iowa statute
imposes no obstacle to a sex offender’s entry into Iowa, and it
does not erect an actual barrier to interstate movement.”132 The
court declined to examine whether there was a fundamental right
to intrastate travel.133 The court also declined to find that “the
right to live where you want” was a fundamental right so deeply
entrenched in the history and tradition of the United States that
to deny its protection would sacrifice liberty and justice.134
After dismissing these arguments, the Eighth Circuit was
then required to review the statute to determine if it “rationally
advanced some legitimate governmental purpose.”135 Because
“precise statistical data is unavailable and human behavior is
necessarily unpredictable”136 the court stated that the authority of
the Iowa legislature in erecting measures to protect the health
and safety of its citizens was broad.137 Citing Conn. Dept’t of
128

431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that a zoning ordinance that defined
family in such a way as to prohibit a grandmother from living with her two
grandsons in an area zoned for “single family residences” was
unconstitutional).
129
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 710 (8th Cir. 2005).
130
Id. at 711.
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Id. at 712.
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Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Id. at 713.
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Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 714 (8th Cir. 2005).
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Id. at 715 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Publ. Safety v. Doe,138 the court held that it is rational to believe
that sex offenders present dangers to society and that the danger
of convicted sex offenders committing new sexual crimes upon
their reentry into society is high.139 Because of these dangers the
court felt that the restriction advanced a legitimate government
purpose and that the legislature of a state is the proper
decision-maker in determining the appropriate distance.140
The court then rejected a challenge based on the
constitutional right against self-incrimination found in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments141 and turned to the issue of
whether these residence restrictions constituted an attempt at ex
post facto punishment.142 Since the Iowa General Assembly did
not intend to create a law of criminal punishment,143 the court
had to inquire as to whether the purpose or effect of the law was
so punitive that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.144 Because
the court believed that the purpose of the law was not
punitive,145 the judges then turned to the question of whether the
effect of the law was punitive.146
Like the Supreme Court in Smith,147 the plaintiffs in Miller
pointed to the similarities between residence restrictions and
banishment in an attempt to prove punitive effect.148 However,
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Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 1 (2003) (dealing with a
constitutional challenge to website that registered sex offenders’ whereabouts
and level of dangerousness pursuant to Connecticut’s version of Megan’s
Law).
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Miller, 405 F.3d at 715.
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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 716 (8th
Cir. 2005).
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the Eighth Circuit did not find this argument compelling for two
reasons. First, the residence restriction only affected where
offenders may reside but did not “expel” them from the
community.149 Since offenders could still access every area of
Iowa “for employment, to conduct commercial transactions, or
for any purpose other then establishing a residence”150 the
comparison to banishment failed.151 Second, the court pointed
out the “novelty” of residence restrictions, indicating that it
could not be similar to a traditional means of punishment
because it was a new idea.152
Turning to the issue of whether the law promoted traditional
punishment aims of deterrence and retribution, the Eighth
Circuit found that the law intended to deter and that it was not
overly retributive.153 In addition, the law did not impose an
affirmative disability or restraint.154 The judges compared the
civil commitment of the mentally ill to residence restrictions155
and pointed out that in the first case courts have consistently
held that such confinement “does not necessarily impose
punishment because it bears a reasonable relationship to a
‘legitimate nonpunitive objective.’”156 Finally, the court
examined whether Iowa Code § 692A.2A had a rational
149

Id.
Id.
151
Of course, if the goal of residence restrictions is to keep convicted
sex offenders away from potential victims then this argument is nonsensical.
True, sex offenders are prevented from living next to schools, but as the
Court points out with this argument, which does not deny them access to
these areas for almost any other purpose. Id. at 712.
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Id. at 720.
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connection to a non-punitive purpose.157 Again, the court felt
that the law fit the purpose of protecting the public health and
safety and was not so overbroad as to become punitive.158 In the
end the Eighth Circuit upheld Iowa Code § 692A.2A and
reversed the lower court decision that had found this residence
restriction unconstitutional.
C. Miller In Light of Philadelphia
The Eighth Circuit failed to consider in Miller the
repercussions that Iowa’s residence restriction might have on
neighboring states. The Iowa Code § 692A.2A is not nearly as
restrictive as the statutory provision struck down in Philadelphia
nor does it obviously affect interstate commerce, but a few
parallels still exist.
First, in both cases states attempt to deal with a problem by
restricting its ability to exist within the state. In Philadelphia,
this meant barring waste from entering into New Jersey’s
borders. Miller’s goal was to bar sex offenders from residing
within certain zones. In both cases the legislatures are attempting
to prevent their states from being the receptacle of a distasteful
problem.159
As the court pointed out in Philadelphia, it is unfair for one
state to place the burden of dealing with a difficult problem onto
those outside of the state.160 Again, while Iowa is not ejecting all
sex offenders from within its borders nor preventing others from
moving into the state, it is now more difficult for sex offenders
157

Id. at 721.
Id. at 722.
159
Since the decision of the Eighth Circuit more states have added
restrictive sex offender residence requirements. In 2006 Georgia passed a
1,000 feet restriction that not only included schools, playgrounds and parks
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staying in our state.” Greg Bluestein, Sex Offender Challenges Ga. Residency
Restrictions, WASHINGTON POST, June 16, 2006. Such an attitude clearly
portrays isolationist tendencies by a lawmaker.
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to live in Iowa than in other states without residency
restrictions.161 Since each state has the burden of monitoring the
sex offenders that live within its borders, the effect of state-wide
residence restrictions might put a greater burden on states that
do not have such restrictions.
Also, sex offenders who desire to move to Iowa might be
deterred by the presence of residence restrictions. This could
have an inadvertent effect on interstate commerce and also
interstate real estate transactions. While sex offenders may not
represent a large percentage of the population this type of
residency restriction might have some effect on interstate
commerce.162
III. RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS AND EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
In examining the form and the general effect of residence
restrictions, one comparison with property law becomes
apparent: exclusionary zoning. Exclusionary zoning, for the
purposes of this note, refers to the efforts of groups within
localities to use the zoning code to achieve specific social goals.
Exclusionary zoning is defined as “land use control regulations
which singly or in concert tend to exclude persons of low or
moderate income from the zoning municipality.”163
A. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel
In 1975, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided the
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel.164 Various parties brought suit against the Township on
161

For example, Time Magazine reported that an anonymous sex
offender planned to uproot from Mason City, Iowa and move to a
neighboring state such as Nebraska or South Dakota. Anita Hamilton,
Banning the Bad Guys, TIME, Sept. 5, 2005, at 72.
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Such a study is beyond the resources of the author, but is worth
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the grounds that the land use regulations passed by the
municipality had the discriminatory effect of excluding low and
moderate income families from the area.165
Mount Laurel’s problems can be traced to Philadelphia’s
rapid expansion and the growing number of highways running
through New Jersey.166 As more and more people moved into
this suburb of Philadelphia the number and extent of local
zoning ordinances also grew.167 The township tried to limit its
growth to a certain type.168 For example, 29.2% of the land in
the township was zoned for industry.169 However, only certain
types of industry were permitted—including light manufacturing,
farms and offices.170 Another 1.2% of the total land in the
township was zoned for retail business.171 The remaining land
was divided into four residential zones, all of which only
permitted single-family, detached housing with one house per
lot.172 Within Mt. Laurel there was no area allotted for attached
townhouses, apartments (outside of those permitted on farms) or
mobile homes.173 The court noted that these general ordinance
requirements “realistically allow only homes within the financial
reach of persons of at least middle income.”174 The result of this
exclusionary zoning was to push low and middle-income families
out of Mt. Laurel.175
Mt. Laurel was, at the time of this case, involved in the then
new idea of “planned unit development” (PUD).176 Instead of
housing requirements defined by local legislation, PUD allows
for the town to make a contract with real estate developers,
165
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which uses broad guidelines for building housing.177 While the
developers in this case had included attached townhouses and a
variety of apartments, they would not have been available to
people of low to moderate-income.178 Once again the township
had arranged for housing that would not accommodate people of
below middle-income.179
While the court accepted the argument that the ordinances
were not created with a discriminatory purpose, it nonetheless
found that the zoning regulations had the effect of excluding low
and moderate income families.180 The court called such patterns
of land use regulations “selfish and parochial,”181 and stated that
such laws build walls around towns to keep out “those people or
entities not adding favorably”182 to the desires of the local
community.183
When examining whether such one-sided land use regulations
were legal under the New Jersey constitution the court asked
whether municipalities could validly use zoning to make it
impossible to provide low and middle income housing and
therefore prevent people from these economic categories from
living within the municipality.184 Since zoning laws are
encompassed within New Jersey’s police power the court asked
whether these land use regulations promoted public health,
safety, morals or the general welfare.185 The court also stated
that “a zoning enactment which is contrary to the general
welfare is invalid.”186
In deciding whether the land use regulations promoted the
general welfare the court emphasized that “when regulation does
have a substantial external impact the welfare of the state’s
177
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180
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citizens beyond the borders of the particular municipality cannot
be disregarded and must be recognized and served.”187 The
court went on to explain that the municipal regulations were
designed to create a favorable tax base and ultimately found that
these zoning regulations were not permissible because
“municipalities must zone primarily for the living welfare of
people and not for the benefit of the local tax rate.”188 Since
housing is one of the “basic human needs,”189 the requirement
for adequate housing for all of Mount Laurel’s citizens
outweighed the community’s desire for a favorable tax base.
Essential to the court’s reasoning was the determination that
land use regulations could not be allowed to “foreclose the
opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for low and
moderate income housing”190 especially considering that the
municipality must shoulder a “fair share of the present and
prospective regional need [for low and middle income
housing].”191 The court emphasizes that “every municipality . . .
must bear its fair share of the regional burden” of providing low
and middle income housing.192 The interests of citizens
throughout the region and state were taken into consideration,
and in light of those interests, the court found Mount Laurel’s
zoning regulations impermissible.
B. Property Analogies
Examining the facts in Mt. Laurel reveals several similarities
between those exclusionary zoning regulations and residence
restrictions for sex offenders. First, in both cases local
municipalities sought to use a form of zoning, an element of
property law, to exclude an unwanted group. In both situations
the effect of these laws is to push the unwanted group outside of
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the borders of the town. While in the abstract this seems
feasible, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Mt. Laurel pointed
out that this only shifted the burden to the rest of the state.193
The same effect can be seen in the case of residence restrictions
for sex offenders. “While states attempt to force sex offenders to
live elsewhere with the intent of making their communities safer,
inevitably the new community where the offenders will be living
is forced to deal with those problems, which it may be illequipped to do.”194 The sweeping-the-problem-under-the-carpet
approach to sex offenders might be very attractive to each
community in the short term. The end result is not to fix the
problem but only to allow it to fester elsewhere.
IV. CRITICISMS OF RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS
While this note focuses on the similarities between residence
restrictions and exclusionary zoning, it is important to briefly
address the criticisms leveled at residence restrictions. Residence
restrictions are designed to address “stranger danger.”195 This
term refers to the idea that sex offenders prey on children that
they do not know.196 In reality, this is a highly inaccurate myth.
In fact, amongst juvenile female victims only 7.5% were
assaulted by a stranger, while 58.7% were assaulted by an
acquaintance and 33.9% were assaulted by a family member.197
Juvenile male victims were even less likely to be assaulted by a
stranger where only 5% of young male victims were assaulted
by strangers, while 59.2% were assaulted by acquaintances and
35.8% were assaulted by family members.198 This data
contradicts the common fear that a stranger will be the one to
193
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Michael J. Duster, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts to
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assault a child. In fact, based on the statistics, the people
surrounding children daily are the ones potentially posing the
greatest danger.199 Residence restrictions are useless to prevent
acquaintances or family members from assaulting children. They
also do not stop strangers from assaulting children since they do
not prevent registered sex offenders from entering a restricted
zone, just from living within one.200
Residence restrictions also prevent sex offenders from living
near areas where children congregate but do not prevent an
offender from living next door to minors.201 Nor do the laws
account for the fact that sex offenders are more likely to travel
outside of their neighborhood to avoid recognition if they
attempt to re-offend.202 For example, in a recent study, one
offender stated: “You don’t want me to live near a school where
the kids are when I’m at work. The way it is now, when I get
home from work, they are home too—right next door.”203 The
statistics and studies regarding juvenile sexual assault do not
appear to support the current form of residence restrictions.
V. PUSHING THE PARIAH ASIDE & OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The attractiveness of residence restrictions can be obvious.
First, from a legislative view, restrictions allow elected officials
to quickly respond to their constituents’ concerns. Taking a
stand against sex offenders and for America’s children is a
politically popular move.204 In addition, residence restrictions
are inexpensive, especially in comparison to further
incarceration, treatment programs, and other forms of
monitoring. The primary cost of the restriction is born by the
sex offender himself, not by the tax payers of any community.
199
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Finally, residence restrictions are easy to implement. Again, the
primary responsibility falls on the offender himself as a
condition of his parole.205 Since all fifty states have registry
requirements,206 it will be clear to parole officers and other law
enforcement officials when a registered offender is violating the
residence restriction.207
A. Efficiency Argument
Courts often consider the assignment of risk, especially when
faced with a dangerous situation or condition. Courts will
consider what party is best suited to prevent the contemplated
danger and ask which party should be assigned the risk, in
addition to which party can most effectively prevent the risk
from occurring. From a purely economic standpoint, it is usually
the creator of a product that is best suited to prevent the danger
because they are most knowledgeable and it is generally most
convenient for them to do so. In the case of sex offenders, it is
clear that they are in the best position to prevent further
molestation, but the issue then becomes who is in the best
position to watch over these offenders. Is it larger municipalities
with larger police forces and more funding but also with higher
populations of children? Or is it smaller municipalities in more
rural areas? This note argues that the best party to assume this
risk is the larger municipalities, and that pushing sex offenders
aside, outside of larger towns through residence restrictions will
eventually overwhelm the more rural areas to which sex
offenders move.208
The Minnesota legislature rejected statewide residence
restrictions partly for this reason: “proximity restrictions will
have the effect of restricting [offenders] to less populated areas,

205
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with fewer supervising agents and fewer services for offenders
(i.e., employment, education, and treatment).”209 As Mt. Laurel
Township and Philadelphia point out, there are some problems
that are common to an entire region and even to the entire
nation.210 To isolate one’s community from this problem might
seem attractive and certainly helps resolve fears of the “not in
my backyard” philosophy. However, it is a selfish and
ultimately futile solution.
B. Effect on Property
One effect of residence restrictions on real property is to
decrease the pool of potential homebuyers available to people
wanting to sell their property that is located inside a restricted
zone.211 In addition, residence restrictions act as a type of
zoning and affect how homeowners are able to use their
property. For example, if a homeowner wanted to form a halfway house within a restricted area they could not. Restrictions
on property diminish the transferability of land and thus
residence restrictions negatively affect innocent property
owners.212
Also at issue is who will be responsible for ensuring
restrictions are met. The burden could be placed on those selling
property. Additional title insurance might be required to cover
the sale of property to a buyer who is unable to assume
residency due to a past conviction of a sex crime. Then comes
the issue of whether sellers would be guilty of fraud if they
know that their home is within a restricted zone but do not
209

Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Level Three Sex Offenders Residential
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210
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Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 17274 (the problems addressed in these cases are not related to sex offenders).
211
As of Oct. 3, 2005 there were nearly 500,000 registered sex
offenders. See Robert F. Worth, Exiling Sex Offenders from Town, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at B1.
212
See generally, PROPERTY Chs. 6-11 (Jesse Dukeminier and James E.
Kreier eds., 1981).
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reveal this information upon the sale. Another consideration is
the effect on the recordation system for deeds—each recorded
deed might need to be modified to reflect this new land use
restriction. These issues are only a few that affect all home
owners in states with residence restrictions and that have not
been addressed by the legislature, along with residence
restrictions against sex offenders.213
C. Public Misperception
In May 2005 when Hamilton Township passed its latest
residence restriction, the Township Council opened the floor to
the public in order to ensure all concerns were addressed.214 The
comments from the townspeople of Hamilton Township215 reveal
some common misconceptions about sex offenders and also
expose the failure to appreciate the consequences of registry
restrictions.
Hamilton Township’s mayor, Glen D. Gilmore stated:
Tonight we’re hoping to enact an ordinance that I
believe will add another strand to the safety net that
protects our children . . . This ordinance is a
common sense ordinance . . . I’m hopeful that tonight
Hamilton Township will lead our state in enacting a
law that’s common sense and enacting a law that says
convicted child sex offenders, convicted child sex
offenders that have a high rate of re-offense will not
be permitted to live within twenty-five hundred feet
of a school, playground, a child care center or a
park. That is common sense and that is something
that I hope tonight will add to our measures to protect
those who are too young to protect themselves.216

213

See Henderson, supra note 102, at 822-24 (for a good discussion on
the repercussions that residence restrictions have on home sales).
214
Hamilton Township Meeting Minutes, supra note 93.
215
Obviously these selected statements do not represent every opinion on
this issue.
216
Hamilton Township Meeting Minutes, supra note 93, at 4.
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This statement, while passionate and understandable, contains
many misconceptions about child molesters. First, it is not a
common sense measure that preventing child molesters from
living near schools and other designated areas will prevent them
from molesting those children.217 In 2005, J.S. Levenson and
L.P. Cottor conducted a survey of 135 sex offenders living in
Florida in order to study the impact that residence restrictions
had on the rehabilitation and reintegration of sex offenders back
into society.218 As Levenson and Cottor’s study reveals, sex
offenders prefer to offend away from their place of residence.219
In addition, child sex offenders have the lowest comparative rate
of recidivism among all convicted felons.220
Danielle Ference, a member of Hamilton Township and a
participant at the meeting, stated:
To me, it has nothing to do with Civil Rights. It’s got
nothing to do with race or religion. It’s about a
predator, a convicted sexual predator and keeping
them away from exactly what they prey our children.
I don’t know about you, and I don’t know what the
statistics are, but I do know every time I read the
paper (sic) but I know every time I read the paper,
and I read about one of these cases, nine times out of
ten, it is a repeat sex offender. They may serve their
time, but what they take from these children, the
lucky ones that live to talk about it, is something that
they can never get back. They won’t get it back in
three to five years. This ban is important to me,
maybe more than most . . . These children are our
future and I can assure you the effects of something
217

J.S. Levenson and L.P Cottor, The Impact of Sex Offender Residence
Restrictions: 1,000 Feet from Danger or One Step from Absurd?, 49 INT’L J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 168 (2005).
218
Id.
219
Id. (emphasis added).
220
Patrick A. Langan, Erica L. Schmitt, and Matthew R. Durose,
Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs), Nov.
2003, at 30.
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like this has on a child will stay with them for ever.
It changes the way that they think and the way that
they live their lives. How they are gonna look at
other people and how they are gonna view the
world.221
Ference’s comment reveals a common problem with residence
restrictions. The problem is that residence restrictions, while
banning sex offenders from certain areas of a municipality, do
not bar sex offenders from coming into contact with children.222
Sex offenders might not be able to live near parks, schools or
day care centers, but they certainly can walk by them whenever
they so choose. Residence restrictions are defined by restricting
residence—they do not restrict movement, of sex offenders or of
children.
In addition, the strictest residence restrictions might protect
one town at the expense of another. In areas where residence
restrictions prevent sex offenders from living within a certain
municipality there is still the municipality next door. What many
people fail to realize is that they are not banning child molesters
from their own town without consequences—they are merely
sending these “predators” to the next town over to prey on
someone else’s child.
Again it is clear from Ference’s statement that there are still
misconceptions regarding the recidivism of sexual offenders.223
According to a study by the Department of Justice,224 based on

221

Hamilton Township Meeting Minutes, supra note 93, at 5.
See generally Roig-Franzia, supra note 8. The current sex offender
residence restrictions on the books do not prevent registered sex offenders
from speaking with or contacting children.
223
It has been surmised that such misconceptions have driven legislatures
to create registration and notification statutes. These misconceptions might
also explain the attractiveness of residence restrictions to legislatures
pressured by their constituents to “do more” about child molestation. See
Eileen K. Fry-Bowers, Controversy and Consequence in California: Choosing
between Children and the Constitution, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 889, 906
(2004).
224
The Department of Justice examined arrest records for 9,691 male
sex offenders who had been released from prisons in fifteen states. See
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official arrest records, 5.3% of sex offenders released in 1994
were rearrested for a new sex crime within the first three years
following their release.225 The same study reveals that 2.2% of
child molesters and statutory rapists were rearrested within three
years for sex crimes against a child.226 In contrast, recidivism
rates among prisoners released in 1994 for non-sexual crimes
were much higher; in fact 67.5% of prisoners studied were
rearrested for committing a crime three years later.227
Meanwhile, only 43% of released sex offenders were
rearrested for any type of crime three years following their
release.228 Therefore, sex offenders do not have the highest rates
of recidivism among released criminals. In fact, the rates of
recidivism among sex offenders for committing another sex
crime were the lowest among all released prisoners who were
then rearrested for committing the same crime for which they
were put in jail.229 For example, 13.4% of released robbers
were rearrested for the same category of offense for which they
were just in prison.230
In addition, the Bureau of Justice surmises that by
extrapolating on current data regarding sex crimes within their
study “released sex offenders accounted for 13% and released
non-sex offenders accounted for 87% of the 3,845 sex crimes
committed by all the prisoners released in 1994.”231 This reveals
that the most dangerous sex criminals are not in fact registered
sex offenders, but rather other parolees who were guilty of
crimes but who are not required to register under current
Patrick A. Langan, Erica L. Schmitt, and Matthew R. Durose, Recidivism of
Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994 (Bureau of Justice Statistics
2003).
225
Id. at 24.
226
Id. at 31.
227
Id.
228
See id. at 14 (emphasis added)
229
See supra note 224 for a further discussion.
230
See Patrick A. Langan, Erica L. Schmitt, and Matthew R. Durose,
Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994 (Bureau of Justice
Statistics 2003).
231
Id. at 24.
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statutes.232

VI. WORKABLE ALTERNATIVES
This note has focused mainly on states that have
implemented residence restrictions, but workable alternatives
exist. Two states who have not implemented residency
restrictions, Colorado and Minnesota, can offer insight into
practical alternatives.
In March of 2004 the Colorado Department of Public Safety
issued a report for the legislature of Colorado studying the effect
of sex offender living arrangements on community safety.233 The
Minnesota Department of Corrections issued a similar report in
January of 2003.234 After the results from these reports were
disclosed to the state legislatures both bodies decided not to
enact residence restrictions. Comparing these two reports reveals
several themes and alternatives to sex offender registration
including case-by-case treatment of each individual offender and
supportive living situations/housing solutions. In addition, such
current methods of offender monitoring as registry requirements,
neighborhood notification and education are also effective
solutions.235

232

An exception to this general statement is Montana, which is one of a
few states that requires registration of violent offenders. Montana requires
that violent offenders, or those convicted of specified crimes like assault,
arson or homicide, register with local law enforcement along with sex
offenders. Montana Department of Justice, Sexual and Violent Offender
Registry, http://www.doj.mt.gov/svor/offendertypes.asp (last visited Dec. 7,
2005).
233
Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety: Div. of Criminal Justice—Sex Offender
Mgmt. Bd., Report on Safety Issues Raised By Living Arrangements For and
Location of Sex Offenders in the Community (2004).
234
Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Level Three Sex Offenders Residential
Placement Issues: 2003 Report to the Legislature (2003).
235
For a good discussion of current methods and alternatives of
monitoring and treating sex offenders see Henderson, supra note 102, at
823-39.
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A. Case-By-Case Evaluations
An often cited solution to preventing recidivism among sex
offenders is a case-by-case analysis of every sex offender and a
tailoring of solutions to fit his or her individual needs.236 Every
sex offender has a unique fingerprint of offense, with different
triggers and victim characteristics.237 An effective solution to
one offender’s problem might stoke the flames of another’s
sickness.
In addition to being effective and practical this solution
would not have to be prohibitively expensive since before their
release from prison most sex offenders must appear before
parole boards who then evaluate each individual before
release.238 Adding a comprehensive evaluation of the individual
offender and a plan for parole would be a very effective and
practical way of ensuring that each offender is treated in a way
that will best prevent future offenses. Also, this will allow
certain residence restrictions to be put in place for offenders that
need this type of surveillance. Simultaneously, there will not be
the problems associated with widespread blanket residence
restrictions.239 As the Minnesota Department of Corrections
stated, “since blanket proximity restrictions on residential
locations of [offenders] do not enhance community safety, the
current offender-by-offender restrictions should be retained.”240
B. Housing Solutions
Studies often cite the isolation of sex offenders as a mistake
in the effort to prevent recidivism.241 “Research regarding
dynamic risk has indicated that a lack of positive social support
and depressed mood, anger and hostility are all associated with

236
237
238
239
240
241

See e.g., Levenson & Cotter, supra note 81.
Id.
Henderson, supra note 102, at 833.
Id. at 823.
Minn. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 234, at 11.
Levenson, supra note 217, at 175.
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recidivism.”242 Colorado pointed out that residence restrictions,
by limiting housing options available to sexual offenders “may
increase their risk of re-offending by forcing them to live in
communities where safe support systems may not exist or in
remote areas providing them with high degrees of
anonymity.”243
In fact, the Colorado study found that the offenders with the
lowest recidivism rates where those who lived in Shared Living
Arrangements with other convicted sex offenders. 244 The report
stated that the success of the offenders in these types of
arrangements is probably related to the fact that “offenders hold
each other accountable for their actions and responsibilities and
notify the appropriate authorities when a roommate commits
certain behaviors.”245 In addition, the offenders are living with
others who share the same temptations and desires to improve,
so there is simultaneous support along with monitoring. In
addition, these SLAs are not isolated from the rest of the
community, so offenders are reintegrated back into society.246
C. Offender Monitoring
This note has already examined residence restrictions and
their popularity and effectiveness.247 Registries have already
been examined by the Supreme Court and found to be a
constitutional expression of the legislative right to protect the
health and safety of a state’s citizens. Also, all 50 states already
have SORAs. SORAs are also an attractive solution because the
primary burden is on the offender, as opposed to the
242

Id.
Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, supra note 233, at 9.
244
In general, Shared Living Arrangements (SLAs) are a small group of
convicted sex offenders living together in a house. The offenders have the
responsibility over the residence, whose location and composition is
determined in advance by a provider of treatment and a supervising parole
officer. Id. at 12-13.
245
Id. at 13.
246
See generally, Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, supra note 233, at 12-14.
247
See discussion Part I.A.
243
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community. In short, registration requirements have many
advantages over residence restrictions, including the fact that
they have already been implemented, challenged and altered to
fit each state’s own experiences.248
Electronic monitoring refers to the use of global positioning
technology to track convicted sex offenders.249 Parolees who
qualify for these types of programs must wear an electronic,
waterproof ankle band that is linked to a global positioning
system (GPS) transmitter; if the wearer strays too far from their
transmitter, an alert is sent to law enforcement authorities.250
The GPS transmitters can be stationary or portable. The system
can send alerts to law enforcement officials if the sex offenders
approach areas like schools or child care facilities.251 Through
the use of global positing technology, sex offenders can be
monitored at all times and some states have even sentenced
offenders to electronic monitoring for life.252 According to the
experiences of Florida, one of the first and most active
proponents of this type of monitoring, offenders under the GPS
program are less likely to violate their paroles when compared
to others under traditional modes of monitoring.253 The Jessica
Lunsford and Sarah Lunde Act254 would have provided federal
funding to implement these systems.255 Again, this form of
monitoring has the advantage of some proof of effectiveness.

248

This can be seen by viewing the different requirements that each state
has come up with to deal with the registration of its sex offenders. See
generally Adams, supra note 11.
249
Id. at 10.
250
Wired News, States Track Sex Offenders by GPS,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,68372,00.html?tw=rss.POL
(last visited Dec. 8, 2005).
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(2005).
255
Id.

MEGHAN

3/7/2007 1:25 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

330

D. Neighborhood Notification
Informing parents and neighbors of a sex offender residing
nearby is another way to prevent future offenses. Public
notification of residential locations of [offenders] serves a
valuable service and should continue. Community residents with
this knowledge are able to determine what level of interaction
they feel is acceptable for their family safety. The information
raises awareness, dispels rumors and allows a greater knowledge
of safety issues.256
This method allows individuals to work with law
enforcement officials in helping to prevent future offenses by
keeping their families out of danger. It also spurns community
involvement in the monitoring of sex offenders and could
possibly calm parental fears and foster an understanding of the
true threat posed by convicted sex offenders.257
Concerns that notification might actually encourage
community fears and promote vigilantism are already addressed
through SORAs, which include provisions designed to punish
those who use the information contained in such registries for
unlawful purposes.258
E. Education
Education of both possible victims and sex offenders, when
combined with the above solutions, is one of the most effective
ways to prevent future sex offenses.259 Teaching children to
beware of danger and to report inappropriate behavior will help
to prevent abuse and will also improve our understanding of
exactly how widespread sexual offenses are against children.260
256

Minn. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 234, at 11.
Id.
258
See supra note 21 for a further discussion.
259
Congress has made education a priority in its newest efforts to
combat sexual crimes. See generally, Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act of 2006, H.R. 4472, 109th Cong. (2006).
260
Sexual offenses are considered to be one of the crimes that is least
likely to be reported to the police. See TIMOTHY C. HART & CALLIE
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Educating sex offenders about the nature of their offenses and
who they hurt is considered to be an effective way of preventing
re-offense and an essential tool in rehabilitating sex offenders.261
By educating both sides, society may begin to address the causes
of sexual offenses and prevent further offenses.
CONCLUSION
While on the surface residence restrictions appear to be a
low cost and effective way of protecting the nation’s children, a
deeper look reveals otherwise. Applying the framework,
conclusions and even dicta from cases like Philadelphia,262 Mt.
Laurel,263 and Smith264 reveal that residence restrictions are far
from a simple solution. They raise constitutional issues as well
as issues of fairness, not to mention practical concerns on the
mobility of real property. After scrutinizing the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in Miller265 problems become self-evident.
Residence restrictions are based on widespread public
misconceptions.266 Rates of recidivism are often cited
improperly, not only by politicians, but by the courts
themselves. In addition, there is a general lack of knowledge
regarding what causes sex offenders to commit crimes against
children. Finally, the criminal mindset of each individual sex
offender could differ greatly.267 What might seem like a good
solution to prevent one offender from re-offending would be the
completely wrong punishment for another. Residence restrictions
can also worsen the problem of monitoring sexual offenders by
isolating them from society, aggravating housing problems,
decreasing the ability to register and removing them from areas
RENNISON, REPORTING CRIME TO THE POLICE, 1992-2000 3 (Bureau of
Justice Statistics 2003).
261
See e.g. Levenson & Cotter, supra note 217.
262
437 U.S. 617.
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where treatment options exist.268
In addition to the above practical concerns, residence
restrictions do not relate favorably to landmark property
decisions and real estate ideals. First, courts have consistently
rejected the concept of exclusionary zoning as a form of social
management. Second, when municipalities construct residence
restrictions for sex offenders they are often banishing such
offenders from their towns. This has the result of unequally
spreading the burden associated with sex offenders to other
municipalities. Third, residence restrictions can be viewed as a
type of constraint on the mobility and transferability of real
property. Like restrictive covenants this can decrease the
marketability of land. Therefore the burden of residence
restrictions falls not only on convicted sex offenders but also on
people wishing to sell their homes. Other considerations, such as
voidability of real estate contracts between convicted sex
offenders and sellers of homes, are raised by these statutes and
are not addressed by the legislature—leaving vast areas of
uncertainty caused by sex offender residence restrictions.
Residence restrictions, while facially attractive, are unduly
burdensome to both registered sex offenders and the
communities that must eventually receive them. The presence of
other methods of managing convicted sex offenders makes
residence restrictions look even less attractive. With the
prevalence of other less costly, less broad and more effective
modes of control residence restrictions are truly unnecessary.
There are ways of managing sex offenders without infringing on
the mobility of real estate or the ideals of the constitution.
Solutions exist, such as education and monitoring to address
public fear and disgust towards sex offenders—solutions that can
meet the needs of legislatures, law enforcement officials,
parents, victims and the offenders themselves.
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See, COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY: DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE—SEX
OFFENDER MGMT. BD., REPORT ON SAFETY ISSUES RAISED BY LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND LOCATION OF SEX OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY
(2004); MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS RESIDENTIAL
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